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The European Union institutional package launched in response to the financial crisis 
used Article 114 TFEU as its legal basis. The author explores the legal basis for one of the 
European Supervisory Authorities recently established- the European Banking Authority 
(EBA). The use of Article 114 TFEU, the main Treaty basis used to harmonise laws in 
order to further the internal market, as the foundation for the EBA, is considered in 
detail. A paradox of contemporary EU Institutional law is assessed here, considering 
whether on the one hand, the EBA is functionally both too narrow and too broad as a 
matter of law, while on the other hand, it may prove to be central to restoring 
confidence in EU regulatory powers, rendering it “too big to fail,” despite its slender 
foundations in Article 114 TFEU. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While the precise causes of the global financial crisis may still be the subject of 
reflection, the European Union responded to the crisis principally with an institutional or 
“supervisory architecture” package: a European System of Financial Supervision, 
comprising several institutions known as European Supervisory Authorities (ESA’s).
1
 A 
curiosity arises from the fact that all of these institutions now enacted into EU law are 
grounded in Article 114 TFEU as their legal base.
2
 Article 114 TFEU was and is the 
∗
 Visiting Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute, Florence, Italy and Lecturer, School of Social 
Sciences and Law, Dublin Institute of Technology, Ireland. Email: Elaine.fahey@eui.eu. I am very grateful 
to the conference discussants at the European University Institute conference “2007-2010 Financial and 
Economic Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses” (April 2010) and to Ester Herlin-Karnell, 
Stephen Carruthers and the reviewers for their comments. All errors are solely those of the author.  
1
 Comprising a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) and A European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB), consisting of a network of national financial supervisors working in tandem with new European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESA’s), created by the transformation of existing Committees for the banking 
securities and insurance and occupational pensions sectors: European Banking Authority COM(2009) 501; 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (COM(2009) 502 final);  European Securities and 
Markets Authority (COM(2009) 503) all dated 23.9.2009; European Systemic Risk Board (COM(2009) 499, 
23.9.2009). See, for a comprehensive survey, Ferran “Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of 
EU Financial Market Supervision” (20 November 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701147.  
2
 Referred to as Article 114 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (ex. Article 95 EC). 
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controversial “problem child” of the Laeken Declaration
3
 and remains the most 
commonly used legal basis to harmonise laws in order to further the internal market. 
Article 114 TFEU has been employed again recently as the central legal basis to resolve 
Europe’s institutional and regulatory shortcomings. Yet there is no precedent for the 
institutional design on the scale enacted arising from this slender legal base.
4
 
 
One of the several institutions recently established was a European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the legal basis of which is the subject of analysis here. The EBA alone is selected 
from these institutions on the grounds of space but also by reason of its high-profile 
status, its functionally-singular activity and its direct role as to the banking and finance 
industry.
5
 It is contended that the use of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the EBA 
raises many difficulties given the particularly limited tasks and powers conferred on the 
EBA. Equally, however, the systemic reform package may in fact go beyond anything 
previously contemplated or considered as lawful pursuant to Article 114 TFEU. The EBA 
is argued here to be functionally both too narrow and too broad as a matter of EU 
institutional and constitutional law. At a time of crisis, a close examination of the EBA 
may also indicate that the Emperor lacks financial crisis clothes and that a gap exists 
between what is politically and economically desirable and constitutionally possible. 
However, the operation and success of such agencies may bring stability, global 
cohesion and popular confidence in respect of European regulatory powers. Grand 
institutional reforms, not unlike large banks, may prove to be “too big to fail”. This 
paradox of contemporary European institutional law is explored here. 
 
The background to the adoption of the Regulation is considered firstly, followed by an 
outline of the details of the Regulation consideration of the state of the law as to Article 
114 TFEU and the design of EU agencies or institutions. This application of this caselaw 
to the EBA is then considered.  
 
 
1. Background to the EBA 
 
First and foremost, in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008 
the President of the European Commission asked Jacques de Larosière, a former 
Managing Director of the IMF and former Governor of the Bank of France, to chair a 
High Level Group to examine the future of European financial regulation and 
3
 Laeken European Council, Laeken declaration on the future of the Union, SN 273/01, 15.12.2001: see 
Weatherill “Competence and Legitimacy” in Barnard and Odudu eds., The Outer Limits of European Union 
Law (Hart, 2009) p. 17.   
4
 Moreover, the Commission had committed to quelling the growth of new EU agencies back in 2005- 
Draft Interinstituitonal Agreement on the operating framework for the European regulatory agencies 
COM(2005) 59 final. See the critique of Griller & Orator “Everything under control? The “way forward” for 
European agencies in the footsteps of the Meroni doctrine” (2010) 35 European Law Review 3, at 5. 
5
 Although each of the proposed ESA’s is rooted in Article 114 TFEU and much of the analysis could apply 
mutatis mutandis to the other ESA’s as regards their structures and powers.  
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supervision, which published its report in early 2009.
6
 According to de Larosière, 
Governments planning for or negotiating over the rescue of cross-border banks did not 
have access to the same comprehensive information set.
7
 At the London G20 summit in 
April 2009, it was agreed to take a number of steps to reform the international financial 
system, to reshape regulatory systems, to establish supervisory colleges and to extend 
regulation and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions, instruments 
and markets.
8
 In the wake of the de Larosière Report, the Commission presented a 
Communication in May 2009, setting out a vision for an architectural package. This 
package consisted of a European System of Financial Supervisors consisting of a network 
of national financial supervisors working in tandem with new European Supervisor 
Authorities (ESA) created by transforming the existing European Supervisory 
Committees in Banking, Securities and Insurance
9
 into a European Banking Authority 
(EBA), a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and a European 
Securities and Markets Authority.
10
 Also a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has 
been enacted to monitor and assess potential threats to financial stability. These bodies 
were to constitute an overarching framework for financial supervision combined with 
expertise of local micro-prudential supervisory bodies closest to the institutions 
operating in their jurisdictions.
11
 The proposals were swiftly enacted into law and the 
Authorities are to begin work in 2011, on schedule. 
 
The regulation of finance and banking is currently the subject of an extraordinary range 
of legislative initiatives in more than thirty areas- as to, for example, Credit Rating 
Agencies, Corporate Governance, Derivatives, Short selling and Hedge funds.
12
 The EU 
6 
The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: De Larosiere Report (Brussels, 25 February, 
2009); Alford “The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank Regulation: Another Step on the road to Pan-
European Regulation” (2006) 25 Annual Review of Banking & Finance Law 389. See also Alford “The use of 
colleges of regulators under European Union banking law” (2009) 24)(7) Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation 355. 
7
 Writing in 2006, Garcia and Nieto expressed concerns about the need to increase commitment to 
information exchange and to co-ordination of action between home and host state supervisors and other 
regulators in the EU: “Banking crisis management in the European Union: Multiple regulators and 
resolution authorities” (2005) 6(3) Journal of Banking Regulation 206. 
8
G20 Action Plan  (31 March 2009)    
“http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_washington_actionplan_progress_140309.pdf.       
9
 Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors and the Committee of European Securities Regulators. 
10
 See above fn. 1.  
11
 See also the supporting powers set out in the Omnibus Directive 2010/78/EU providing supporting 
provisions for the ESA’s: Amending Directives 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 
2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and 2009/65/EC in respect 
of the powers of the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority and the Recitals included therein.  
12
 See Annex 1 of Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, Council, European 
Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank Regulating Financial Services for 
Sustainable Growth COM(2010) 301 final, enumerating thirty measures).  
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Institutions are alive to the popular support now for regulation.
13
 Serious momentum is 
thus gathering to alter existing legal and regulatory rules and the EBA forms only one 
element in a wide-ranging package of measures. 
 
 And so the question arises as to the form of constitutional clothing that the EU has to 
weather this current storm of regulatory change. Prior to considering the question of 
competence, an outline of the activities and powers of the EBA is attempted here firstly, 
prior to an analysis being conducted of its legal basis, as well as relevant caselaw.  
 
 
2. The EBA Regulation: Structures, Functions and Powers 
 
I. Structures and functions 
 
In the Regulation establishing the EBA,
 14
 it is endowed with legal personality
15
 and has 
administrative and financial autonomy but is accountable to the Parliament and 
Council.
16
  Structurally, the EBA is comprised of a Board of Supervisors, a Management 
Board, a Chairperson, an Executive Director and a Board of Appeal
17
 and is based in 
London.
18
 The tasks of the EBA are provided for in Article 8, including that the EBA will 
contribute to the establishment of high regulatory and supervisory standards, will 
consistently apply Union law, will facilitate the delegation of tasks to competent 
authorities, will cooperate closely with the ESRB,
19
 will conduct peer review analysis and 
to monitor and will assess market developments in its area of competence. It is also 
provided with the power in Article 8(2) to develop draft technical standards, issue 
decisions and opinions as well as the power pursuant to Article 34 to provide opinions 
to the EU institutions in areas related to its own competence. The raison d’etre of the 
EBA appears to be, however, predominantly the development of standards and 
guidelines.
20
  National bodies would retain day-to-day oversight powers but the EBA 
would seek to ensure a common supervisory culture and consistent supervisory 
practices, ensuring a coordinated response in crisis situations. Moreover, national 
13
 “Spring 2010 Eurobarometer- EU Citizens favour stronger European economic governance”  IP/10/1071 
(26 August 2010). 
14
 Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 
716/2009/ EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009 /78/EC. 
15
 Article 5. 
16
 Article 3, similar to the other ESAs.  
17
 Articles 40-58. A decision of the EBA could be appealed to the Board of Appeal. 
18
 Article 7. The other ESAs are based in London and Frankfurt, for optical and perceived power- based 
reasons.  
19
 This closeness is in fact mandatory as a matter of law- Article 36 provides that the EBA “shall co-operate 
with the ESRB”.  
20
 Articles 7 and 8. 
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central banks that were not bank supervisors may attend meetings of the Board of 
Supervisors in a non-voting capacity.
21
 
 
2. Powers 
 
Overall, the EBA holds limited powers, limited responsibilities, limited decision-making 
functions and cannot adopt general regulatory measures. For example, power is 
conferred on the EBA to develop regulatory technical standards in certain areas 
identified in EU financial markets legislation pursuant to Article 10. A detailed procedure 
is set out there for the adoption of such standards, involving the Commission, then the 
Parliament and Council as well as public consultation and Bank Stakeholder groups.
22
 
The Authority has powers pursuant to Article 15 to implement technical standards by 
means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU, which are expressly defined 
“not to imply strategic decisions or policy choices.” In both instances, the Commission 
remains the key decision-maker as to whether to endorse the standards proposed by 
the EBA and how to proceed, suggesting a definitive hierarchical status of the 
institutional structure with the Commission at the pinnacle of standards development 
and questionable independence and accountability of the EBA.
23
 Notably, the EBA 
would lack enforcement powers itself, which would take place instead through the 
Commission.
24
 This is because as a matter of EU law regulatory powers cannot be 
delegated to agencies where the powers are conferred by the Treaties on the EU 
Institutions, pursuant to the Meroni doctrine.
25
 
 
Moreover, it is provided in Article 18 that the Council, in consultation with the 
Commission and ESRB and ESA’s, may determine the existence of an emergency 
situation and after this action, the EBA may adopt decisions requiring competent 
21
 Article 40(4). Axel Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, had argued that the Central Banks 
were not adequately represented on the EBA in an earlier format and that only the ECB would be 
represented on it. He contended that retaining a pivotal role for Central Banks remained of great 
importance to the power dynamic of Central Banking authorities and their cooperation at EU level: 
Weber “The reform of financial supervision and regulation in Europe,” Speech delivered at the Institute 
for International and European Affairs, Dublin, Ireland (10 March 2010).  His critique seems only partially 
answered and the power dynamic remains potentially much more fluid in the new Regulation.  
22
 The EBA develops the standards and the Commission adopts them. The regulatory technical standards 
adopted are delegated acts (pursuant to Article 290 TFEU) and implementing technical standards are 
implementing acts (pursuant to Article 291 TFEU). Commission delegated acts can supplement or amend 
certain non-essential elements of Union acts and Commission implementing acts lay down uniform 
conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts.  
23
 Although Ferran suggests that its room for manoeuvre is limited: above, fn. 1, p. 46.  
24
 Where a national authority did not comply with an EBA recommendation, Commission would thus be 
empowered to address a formal opinion to the national supervisory authority, without prejudice to its 
powers pursuant to Article 258 TFEU to take infringement proceedings: See Article 17(4), where the 
formal opinion of the Commission shall take into the account the recommendation of the Authority 
25
 Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957-8] ECR 133. See Griller & Orator above, fn. 4 and Chamon “EU 
Agencies: Does the Meroni Doctrine make sense?” (2010) 17(3) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 281. 
 5 
                                                     
DOES THE EMPEROR HAVE FINANCIAL CRISIS CLOTHES? REFLECTIONS ON THE LEGAL 
BASIS OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY  
authorities to act.
26
 This hierarchy of powers differs from its earlier legislative format, 
where the Commission alone remained the key decision-maker in times of crisis.
27
 
Where a competent authority does not respond, the EBA may adopt individual decisions 
prevailing over previous decisions of the competent authority.
28
 So only in the latter 
situation is the EBA truly empowered and issues remain as to the ability of individuals to 
challenge the legality of the decision adopted by the EBA pursuant to Article 18(4). It is 
envisaged in the Regulation that the EBA would be empowered to settle disagreements 
between national authorities with binding effect and would be empowered to adopt 
individual decisions to ensure compliance.
29
 It is provided pursuant to Article 33, that 
the EBA may enter “administrative arrangements” with supervisory authorities, 
international organisations and the administrations of third countries. Ostensibly, major 
constitutional questions flow from the nature of the entity that would be created, which 
could issue decisions, for example, as to a US member of the EBA with which it enters an 
“administrative agreement” and where, thereafter, issues arise from the impact of EU 
rules outside of the landmass of the EU. The transnational dimension to this remains 
critical to global financial stability and yet this provision remains buried deep within the 
Regulation, not necessarily explicable in light of the internal market roots of the 
Regulation. Save for some benign references in the Recitals (eg Rec. 17) as to an 
“internal market in financial services,” it is notable that throughout the Regulation the 
internal market is not the expressed focus of this function but rather the functioning of 
financial markets and financial systems of the Union, considered further above. All of 
the above indicates an institution with much potential influence but with limited 
capacity to agitate and react.  
 
Of importance then for present purposes is the legal basis for the proposed regulation, 
Article 114 TFEU. The background to the state of the law is outlined here firstly, 
followed by an analysis of caselaw considering institutional design pursuant to Article 
114 and its application to the EBA. 
 
 
3. Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for the EBA 
 
I. The smoking constitution: the expansive evolution of Article 114 TFEU post-
Tobacco Advertising  
 
 As is well-known, Article 114 TFEU has formed the main legal basis for internal market 
harmonization or approximation of laws.
30
 The Court has a limited record of striking 
26
 Article 18(3). 
27
 Proposal For A Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing A European 
Banking Authority (Brussels, 23.9.2009 COM(2009) 501 Final 2009/0142 (COD)), Article 10.  
28
 Article 18(4). 
29
 See Article 19(3). 
30
 Which provides (in part):  
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down measures that have been enacted pursuant to Article 114 TFEU. Article 114 TFEU 
remains largely unaltered by the Treaty of Lisbon, despite the innovations there to “list” 
legal competences explicitly and involve National Parliaments in both the legislative 
process and subsidiarity controls.
31
 The threshold test for the legislator to invoke Article 
114 TFEU remains that the approximation or harmonisation must have as its “genuine” 
objective the improvement of the conditions of the “establishment and functioning” of 
the internal market.
32
 Mere disparities between national laws do not suffice to warrant 
harmonisation.  Rather: 
 
the Community legislature may have recourse to [Article 114] in particular where 
there are differences between national rules which are such as to obstruct the 
fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect on the functioning of the 
internal market … Recourse to that provision is also possible if the aim is to 
prevent the emergence of such obstacles to trade resulting from the divergent 
development of national laws. However, the emergence of such obstacles must 
be likely and the measure in question must be designed to prevent them.”
33
  
 
The Court has had a difficult time persuading the critics of the virtues of the tests set out 
in its self-proclaimed “consistent” caselaw,
34
 especially its less than rigorous approach 
“1….The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free 
movement of persons nor to those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons….” 
31
 See now Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, 2008/C 115/01, p.1, Title I (competence); Categories of exclusive, shared and 
supporting legislative competence are now provided for, at the outset of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union: Schütze “The European Community’s Federal Order of Competences-A Retrospective 
Analysis” in Dougan & Currie eds. 50 Years of the European treaties looking back and thinking forward 
(Hart, 2009) p. 63; Schütze “Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of Federalism” (2009) 68 
Cambridge Law Journal 525 and Schütze “Lisbon and the federal order of competences: a prospective 
analysis” (2008) 33 European Law Review 709; Dougan “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not 
Hearts” (2008) 45 CMLRev. 617, section 6.2; Barrett ''The King is Dead, Long Live the King: The Recasting 
by the Reform Treaty of the Provisions of the Constitutional Treaty Concerning National Parliaments” 
(2008) 33 European Law Review 66; House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee Subsidiarity, 
National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty (HC 563, 33rd Report of Session 2007-2008), Ch. 3; See 
Protocol (No. 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.  
32
 Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419, para. 84. 
33
 See Case C-58/08 The Queen on the application of Vodafone Ltd. & others v. Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform & others (Mobile Phone Roaming) [2010] I-ECR 0000, Paras 
32-33. Earlier caselaw in the 1990s, such as the Working Time Directive decision, had held that Article 114 
could not ground the validity of a measure where it had its principal objective rooted in other Treaty 
provisions, for example, the health and safety of workers: C-84/94 UK v. Council (Working Time Directive) 
[1996] ECR I-5755.  
34
 Mobile Phone Roaming ibid, Paras 32. As Herlin-Karnell states (discussing the decision of the Court in 
Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Parliament & Council [2009] ECR I-00593 and the construction by the Court of 
Article 114 TFEU): “[t]he difficulty is where to draw the line: anything could constitute an obstacle …” 
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to defining “obstacles” to the functioning of the internal market and the “likelihood” of 
their materialisation.
35
 However, the caselaw was dramatically coloured by the Tobacco 
Advertising (No. 1)
36
 decision, which remains isolated as an instance of the Court striking 
down legislation rooted in Article 114 TFEU. The Court famously held there that Article 
114 TFEU did not constitute a “generalised” competence clause for the legislature. 
There, serious restrictions contained in Directive 98/43/EC on the approximation of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to the 
advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products in various media were struck down by 
the Court as the directive did not have as its genuine objective the internal market, but 
rather public health. Tobacco Advertising remains the high water mark of intervention 
on the part of the Court.
37
  
 
Then in British American Tobacco
,38 
the Court upheld significant tobacco product 
labelling rules as to health warnings contained in Directive 2001/37/EC concerning the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products. The Court held that national 
rules laying down such product requirements were, in the absence of harmonisation, 
likely to constitute obstacles to free movement of goods. Notably, public health 
considerations clearly motivating the legislation did not operate as a bar to the use of 
Article 114 TFEU. The decision of the Court has been subjected to significant criticism in 
so far the reasoning appears unduly formalistic, failing to rigorously consider whether 
labelling rules truly impacted on free movement.
39
 Swedish Match
40
 is a later and more 
controversial decision again where the Court upheld an outright ban on the marketing 
of tobacco for oral use in the same Directive 2001/37/EC, founded upon (principally) 
Article 114 TFEU.
41
 The Court sanctioned there inter alia the provisional or definite 
Annotation, Case C-301/06 Ireland v. Parliament and Council Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) 10 
February 2009 (2009) 46 CMLRev 1667, 1681. 
35
 See Wyatt “Community Competence to regulate the internal market” in Dougan & Currie eds. 50 Years 
of the European treaties looking back and thinking forward (Hart, 2009) p.  93; Weatherill “Competence 
and Legitimacy”  in Barnard and Odudu eds, The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart, 2009) p. 17; 
Dashwood “Article 308 EC as the Outer Limits of Expressly conferred Community Competence” in Barnard 
and Odudu eds The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart, 2009) p. 35; Hofmann “Which limits? 
Control of powers in an Integrated Legal System” in Barnard and Odudu eds., The Outer Limits of 
European Union Law (Hart, 2009) p. 45; Konstadinides Division of Powers in European Union Law: The 
Delimitation of Internal Competences between the EU & the Member States  (Kluwer,  2009).  
36
 Case C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419. 
37
 A carefully redrawn Directive 2003/33/EC, resulting in a more limited ban, was upheld by the Court in 
Tobacco Advertising II: Case C-380/03 Germany v. Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573.  
38
 Case C-491/01 R v. Secretary of State for Health ex. Parte. British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. 
And Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [2002] ECR I-11453.  
39
 Wyatt, supra fn.35, at p. 126. 
40
 Case C-210/03 R. On the application of Swedish Match AB & Swedish Match UK Ltd. v. Secretary of State 
for Health [2004] ECR I-11893.  
41
 But also ex. Article 133 EC and also raising the difficult question of the relationship between ex. Article 
95(3) EC (now Article 114(3) TFEU and ex Article 152 EC (now Article 168 TFEU), as to the protection of 
health and the standard of its protection in harmonisation laws. Special provisions now exist in Article 114 
TFEU, paras. 6 and 8 as to health.  
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prohibition on the marketing of a product on account the competence of the legislature 
to take “appropriate measures” for the purposes of Article 114 TFEU.  The deployment 
of Article 114 to prohibit outright the circulation of products in light of the emphasis in 
its previous caselaw on the removal of obstacles to trade is perceived by some as an 
extraordinary expansion of the caselaw.
 42
 There are several high profile recent actions 
for annulment on the basis of the use of Article 114 TFEU which again fail.
43
  
 
The “Tobacco saga” ultimately highlights the ebb and flow of EU constitutional law. The 
Court has placed less than rigorous limits on the development of Article 114 TFEU and 
its ambivalent jurisprudence has operated to the advantage of the legislature.  
 
 
II. Is the Article 114 TFEU threshold met by the EBA Regulation? 
 
Firstly, in applying the threshold elements of the Article 114 TFEU caselaw (before and 
after Tobacco Advertising) to the EBA, the single rationale for the adoption of the EBA 
legislation pursuant to Article 114 TFEU appears to be that it will contribute to the 
functioning of the internal market and will strengthen financial stability. It seems 
apparent, however, that mere “differences” between national banking authority rules 
did not constitute barriers to capital movements in Europe such as to hinder the 
functioning of the internal market.
44
  A culture of co-operative supervision appears to 
be the central plank of EBA. The problems arising global and pan-European finance and 
banking in fact were significantly more complex and far-reaching than the workings of 
the internal market. The internal market is very difficult to locate within the operation 
and functional activities of the EBA and its relationship to free movement is at best 
tenuous. Secondly, the EBA is a clear example of pan-European “high-level” cooperation 
and information sharing with “low-level” enforcement powers. However, the ability of 
national authorities to replicate its functions seems apparent also.  Paradoxically, the 
broader “high-level” ambitions of the EBA and ESFS regime generally are of relevance to 
any analysis. The “likelihood” of obstacles to the internal market occurring through the 
lack of an EBA regime is more challenging to refute and the low threshold level of the 
caselaw inures to the benefit of the legislature, in this regard.  
 
 
42
 See Wyatt supra fn. 35, pp. 130-136.  
43
 For example, Mobile Phone Roaming, fn. 33, Data Retention Directive, (fn. 34). 
44
 The House of Commons has outlined that while it was obviously desirable to avoid financial shocks, it 
was not clear that the measures inherently related to the single market but rather to the orderly 
functioning of the financial system: House of Commons Treasury - Sixteenth Report Session 2008-09 The 
Committee's Opinion on proposals for European financial supervision (11 November 2009). See also 
Andoura and Timmerman who question the validity of the use of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for 
the EBA: “Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European Agencies Reignited” EPIN Working 
Papers No. 19 (October, 2008). Cf. Ferran & Alexander “Can Soft Law Bodies Be Effective? 
Soft Systemic Risk Oversight Bodies and the Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board” (13 
September 2010), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676140.  
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4. Key Article 114 TFEU decisions involving the design of EU agencies and their 
powers  
 
The Court has taken an expansive view of administrative powers and the creation of EU 
agencies generally and this jurisprudence is informative for further analysis at this point 
of Article 114 TFEU. However, there is little by way of precedent for a global problem 
with a pan-European dimension being resolved by way of institutions designed pursuant 
to Article 114 TFEU. Key decisions of the Court upholding Article 114 TFEU as a basis for 
creating institutions in harmonisation laws include Germany v. Council (Product 
Safety),
45
 UK v. Parliament (ENISA)
46
 and UK v. Parliament (Smoke Flavourings).
47
 In all 
these three decisions, the Court upheld the institution and/ or procedures enacted 
pursuant to the clause. Indeed, some suggest that the decisions reject a simplistic two-
level model of executive federalism for the EU and a broad view of the administrative 
law toolbox of the EU.
48
 The decisions are first outlined here and then the application of 
the caselaw to the EBA is considered in each case thereafter.   
 
The first and earliest of these decisions is indicative of the broad range of powers the 
Court has sanctioned as regards EU agencies pursuant to Article 114 TFEU. In the 
Product Safety decision,
49
 Germany had there challenged the powers entrusted to the 
Commission in Article 9 of Directive 92/59 on general product safety, an early internal 
market consumer law, adopted pursuant to Article 114 TFEU. The powers were 
accorded to the Commission so as to allow it to take decisions replacing those which 
national authorities had taken to ensure compliance with national laws transposing the 
directive. While the German Government admitted an entitlement of the Commission 
under the Treaties to supervise provisional measures, it disputed the entitlement of the 
Commission to adopt such measures pursuant to Article 114 TFEU. The Court upheld the 
supervisory measures adopted pursuant to Article 114 TFEU
50
 by virtue of the fact that 
the differences could arise between the measures taken by the States on foot of the 
Directive itself.
51
 Moreover, the Court stressed that the powers granted to the 
Commission were to deal with serious and emergency situations, often of last resort. 
The Court held that the powers were necessitated by the serious and immediate risks to 
consumers.
”52
 The emphasis by the Court on the serious and emergency situations 
arising to warrant the powers is particularly remarkable. Moreover, the schema of the 
Directive itself, of partial harmonisation giving rise to a situation possibly necessitating a 
temporary emergency intervention, is far from “ordinary” as a matter of fact and law. 
Product Safety is then suggested here to be only of partial relevance to the new EBA 
45
 Case C-359/92 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council (Product Safety) [1994] ECR I-3681. 
46
 C-66/04 UK v. Parliament and Council (Smoke Flavourings) [2005] ECR I-10553. 
47
 Case C-217/04 United Kingdom v. Parliament and Council (ENISA) [2006] ECR I-3771. 
48
 Hoffman, supra fn. 35, p.57.  
49
 See supra, fn. 45.  
50
 Described by the Council as “horizontal harmonization” in para. 23.  
51
 Para. 30. 
52
 Para. 34. See paras. 31-34 also.  
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regime. It is hard to find an analogy between the regimes in light of the (predominantly) 
broader and longer-term ambitions of the EBA Regulation.  
 
Secondly, in the more recent decision of Smoke Flavourings,
53
 the UK challenged the use 
of Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis to adopt a Regulation (EC) 2065/2003 on smoke 
flavourings to establish a centralised procedure to authorise smoke flavourings for 
foods, falling short of harmonisation. A two-stage decision-making procedure on the 
authorisation of flavourings was established, giving powers to the European Food Safety 
Authority and the Commission, the latter having to act on an opinion of the former. The 
UK contended that the measure was unclear as to that which was being authorised and 
how it was to be evaluated and that the regulation could have been achieved by the 
simultaneous enactment of identical legislation in Member States.  
The Court upheld the use of Article 114 TFEU on the basis that the divergences between 
national laws and administrative provisions on the evaluation and authorisation of 
smoke flavourings could have hindered free movement and created unfair competition 
warranting the use of Article 114 TFEU.
54
 The Court also upheld the structural 
arrangements where harmonisation was comprised of several stages: here relating to 
the fixing of criteria and the adoption of a specific list. The Court here held that the 
legislature had to determine the basic act and the mechanisms to implement those 
elements, which it had done in this case. Moreover, the Court held that the regulation 
did not have the incidental effect of harmonising the internal market but rather 
approximated laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States.
55
  
 
The test employed by the Court here as to the threshold to invoke Article 114 is very 
broad indeed again. The Court was prepared to uphold mere differences between laws 
of Member States as warranting legislative intervention pursuant to Article 114 and on 
this mode of reasoning, surely Article 114 TFEU could provide a valid legal basis for the 
EBA, even if the internal market remains far from central to the operation and rationale 
for the EBA. The Court in Smoke Flavourings was prepared to grant reasonably broad 
regulatory powers to both an agency and an EU institution as an exercise in shared 
decision-making. The complexity of the EBA regime again, however, does not fall 
squarely within the parameters of Smoke Flavourings. The EBA has a broader mandate 
to adopt standards and has broader tasks than the agency in Smoke Flavourings, while 
the true enforcement of standards under the EBA Regulation lies within the remit of the 
Commission only.
56
 Thus Smoke Flavourings does not necessarily serve as an 
appropriate precedent so as to uphold the viability of the EBA Regulation, as power is 
not distributed in the same way between the EBA and the Commission as between the 
relevant institutions in Smoke Flavourings.  
 
53
 See supra, fn. 46.  
54
 Para. 42. 
55
 Para. 58.  
56
 At the behest of all institutions, the EBA or Banking Stakeholder Groups, the EBA can investigate a 
breach of EU law: Article 17.   
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Thirdly, the decision of the Court of Justice in United Kingdom v. Parliament and 
Council (ENISA) is expressly invoked in Recital 17 of the EBA Regulation to bolster its 
legal validity and thus merits close analysis.
57
 In ENISA, the Court upheld the use of 114 
TFEU to establish a European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), in the 
face of a competence challenge by the UK. There, the issue arose as to the legality of 
ENISA, enacted pursuant to Article 1(1) of the Directive 2002/21/EC, establishing a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services.  
ENISA was intended to enhance the ability of the then Community and Member States 
to prevent, address and respond to network and information security problems and to 
provide assistance to these actors and was also empowered to collect information and 
to enhance cooperation. The UK argued that the instrument achieved no different a 
result to that which could have been obtained through the simultaneous enactment of 
legislation in the Member States and the provision of non-binding advice by the agency 
and its limited and inadequately reasoned powers were impugned by the UK. The 
Parliament notably argued that the measures amounted to “low-intensity” 
approximation, leaving national agencies free to exercise their discretion and adopt 
different measures.
58
 The Court reasoned that the Agency was not created in isolation 
but rather as a package of measures and the regulatory schema was complex and 
technologically fast-moving. The Court held that: 
 
“…[In] the light of the characteristics of the subject-matter, the regulation … 
forms part of a normative context circumscribed by the Framework Directive and 
the specific directives and directed at completing the internal market in the area 
of electronic communications ... the Community legislature considered that … 
the Agency was an appropriate means of preventing the emergence of 
disparities likely to create obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal 
market in the area.
59
  
 
Clearly, the reasoning of the Court is particularly broad again with respect to the 
threshold to invoke Article 114 TFEU and would authorise many infrastructural designs.  
Moreover, upholding agencies such as ENISA may in fact be consistent with a nuanced 
sensitivity to subsidiarity and proportionality even in the context of expanded reading of 
Article 114 TFEU.
60
 However, the scale and ambitions of the ESFS reforms entail, it is 
suggested here, that subsidiarity is hardly at the root of the recent regulatory reforms in 
this area, resulting in the enactment of the ESA’s and the EBA in particular.  There still 
remains the possibility that regulatory rules could be adopted simultaneously at 
national level which would achieve the same result as the EBA Regulation. Also, unlike 
the ENISA entity, there remains the important question of its enforcement deficit, i.e, 
whether the EBA will be beneficial or necessary without direct enforcement powers and 
57
 See above, supra fn. 47.  
58
 See Gutman “Casenote Case 66/04 Smoke Flavorings; Case C-463/03, SCE; and Case C-217/04, ENISA” 
(2006/2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 147. 
59
 At para. 58 onwards. 
60
 Hoffman, fn. 35, p. 57.  
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how it could informally coerce third parties (for example, the US) to enforce or consider 
or adopt its rulings (for example, where it has entered administrative agreements with 
those countries, pursuant to Article 33). These questions remain unanswered by the 
Product Safety, Smoke Flavourings and ENISA decisions, indicating the new and 
unprecedented scale of the financial crisis institutional reforms.  
 
 
5. The constitutional and institutional paradox-an EU agency and institutional 
schema with powers that are too narrow and too broad 
 
I. The Paradox 
 
The EBA does not appear to establish anything close to a supranational regulator at EU 
level.
61
 Yet a consensus of views had emerged on the necessity for a strong pan-
European solution, from interest groups to EU institutions. For example, the Investment 
Managers Association had argued that:  
 
“[a] harmonized regulatory and supervisory framework is … of great importance 
to the industry: it is very expensive and inefficient to operate under 27 sets of 
rules, or 27 differing interpretations of the EU rules…There has also been too 
much gold-plating of the EU rules, with national regulators adding requirements 
on top of the EU requirements as they see fit.“
62
 
 
In early 2010, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the Managing Director of the IMF, argued for 
the creation of a European Resolution Authority armed with the mandate and tools to 
deal with failing cross-border banks, an ex-ante solution to the problems that currently 
hamper cooperation in crisis situations rather than an ex-post one, as part of an 
integrated system of crisis prevention.
 63
 In 2010, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
delivered an opinion on the proposed financial structures including the powers of the 
EBA.
64
 On balance, the ECB supported the provisions of the EBA Regulation but had 
61
 As Alford states:  
“The success of integrating European financial markets, particularly wholesale markets, 
facilitated by the common currency, the euro, has highlighted the need for improved supervisory 
coordination among EU regulators. However, colleges of regulators are not supranational 
regulators.” 
See supra, fn. 6, at 360. 
62
 Quoted in House of Commons Treasury - Sixteenth Report  The Committee's Opinion on proposals for 
European financial supervision  Session 2008-09 (11 November 2009) p. 3. 
63
 Building a Crisis Management Framework for the Single Market," 
(Brussels, 19 March 19, 2010): http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/031910.htm 
64
 Opinion Of The European Central Bank of 18 March 2010 on a proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 1998/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 
2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and 2009/65/EC in respect 
of the powers of the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority (CON/2010/23). 
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expressed its concerns as to inter alia its limited powers.
65
 The European Parliament 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee had suggested that the EBA should have 
direct supervision of systemically important cross-border banks, with national 
supervisors acting as agents of the EBA.
66
  
 
Many now argue that the ESA’s, including the EBA, are hindered by their limited 
constitutional competence and that regulatory law is not well served by such 
institutions.
67
 It seems clear, however, that the balance struck as regards the powers 
held by the EBA is founded upon the inherent limitations on the powers of EU agencies 
generally, pursuant to the Meroni doctrine. Indeed, as Ferran states, there are also 
sensitive (non-legal) questions involved in empowering the ESA’s further- questions of 
budgets and financing, as well as Member States’ domestic politics.
68
 This aside, the 
unpalatable point remains that the powers of the EBA may be, as a matter of law, both 
too limited and too broad for the purposes of Article 114 TFEU. The powers of the EBA 
appear unduly limited to perform its true intended function as set out in the systemic 
reforms generally. Equally so, paradoxically, the EBA, its raison d’etre and its powers 
may also be too broad. The EBA does not seem sufficiently nuanced towards internal 
market considerations, in light of the threshold tests for the use of internal market 
harmonisation powers, employing a narrow reading of the caselaw of the Court. The 
fact of the placement of the EBA within a broad package of institutional reforms co-
ordinately placed with other ESA’s may render the system “too big to fail.” This may 
deter the Court from revisiting its strong judicial review exercised in Tobacco Advertising 
I.  
 
 
II. Article 352 TFEU (Ex. Article 308 EC) as an alternative legal base for the EBA? 
 
At this juncture, a brief consideration of an alternative legal basis for the EBA should be 
mentioned. Certain individuals have advocated the use of Article 352 TFEU as the most 
appropriate legal basis for the EBA.
69
 Article 352 TFEU remains the other of the 
“problem children” of the Laeken Declaration. It has a chequered history as a legal basis 
for exceptional constitutional changes that fall outside the remit of the existing terms of 
the Treaties requiring, as is well-known, unlike Article 114 TFEU, unanimous voting in 
65
 Ibid, p.4. The ECB stated that as the then proposed Regulation clarified that competent authorities were 
entitled to share information with the EBA, that it was imperative that all legal obstacles are removed 
prohibiting the exchange of information between the EBA and the ESRB. 
66
 Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee “MEPs vote to beef up financial supervisory package” (10 
May 2005) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/042-74361-130-05-20-907-
20100510IPR74360-10-05-2010-2010-false/default_en.htm (last accessed 28 December 2010).  
67
 See Ferran & Alexander supra fn. 44. Ferran, fn. 1, now seems more sanguine on this point: pp. 63-64.  
68
 Ferran, ibid.  
69
 The House of Commons (fn.44) has suggested that Article 352 TFEU may provide a better basis for the 
package, given that it involves legislation being adopted by unanimity. 
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the Council.
70
 Precedent exists for the creation of institutions founded upon Article 352 
TFEU where no approximation of national laws was envisaged by the institution created, 
such as European Cooperative Society.
71
 Article 352 TFEU was, as Griller and Orator 
state, the exclusive legal basis for agencies in earlier times but the Union legislator has 
made much more use of Article 114 TFEU in recent times.
72
 Article 352 TFEU remains at 
the margins of acceptability in “constitutional” terms given its continued existence after 
the Treaty of Lisbon in the face of constitutional changes made to competence.
73
 In fact, 
the changes made to Article 352 TFEU by the Treaty of Lisbon are slim despite its 
controversy and reinforce its utility as a flexible exceptional legislative tool. Notably, 
Article 352 TFEU now provides that the Commission must draw the attention of National 
Parliaments to the prospective use of the provision and further provides that measures 
based on the article cannot entail harmonization of Member States law or regulations in 
cases where the Treaties exclude harmonisation and the article cannot be used as to 
common and foreign security policy measures.
74
 Thus, there is a legal ring-fence placed 
upon the contours of the expansion of the powers in the Treaties. This curtailment 
appears to have no counterpart as to Article 114 TFEU and there is no effort to restrict 
harmonisation there with formalised institutional ex-ante review, a comparison of 
remarkable importance. However, there still remains a question of the legitimacy of 
employing such residual legal tools for institutional solutions to highly exceptional 
problems of the European Union.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The lexicon employed by the Commission to explain its institutional proposals, which 
encompass the EBA, has been in the form of “strengthening financial supervision.”
75
 
However, an overall assessment of the EBA Regulation reveals, it is suggested here, a 
mere co-operation and information regime. The EBA Regulation does not appear to be 
adequately nuanced towards the caselaw of the Court as to the threshold to invoke 
70
 But see famously Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759 and see generally Weatherill 
“Competence creep and competence control” (2004) 23 Yearbook of European Law 1 
71
 Case C-436/03 Parliament v. Council (ECS) [2006] ECR 1-3733, upholding Regulation No. 1435/2003 on 
the Statute for A European Cooperative Society.  
72
 See generally for an excellent survey, Griller & Orator, supra fn. 4.  
73
 As Dashwood (supra fn. 35) states, at p. 40: 
 “…I believe Article 308 can still perform a useful and constitutionally proper function by allowing 
the powers of the institutions under specific legal bases to be supplemented, where this proves 
necessary to attain the Community objective for which the power in question has been 
conferred. “ 
74
 It is also limited by the provisions of a Declaration, emphasising that the Article may not be used to 
effectively amend the Treaties: see Declaration No. 42 on Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
75
 Communication from the Commission “European financial supervision” COM(2009) 252 final; SEC(2009) 
715 SEC(2009) 716. 
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Article 114 TFEU.  It has been contended here that on the one hand, the EBA is far too 
limited as an entity in light of its broad-ranging objectives to resolve the pan-European 
dimension to a global question, and on the other hand, that it goes too far relative to its 
legal base. As always, the position of the Court on this paradox remains the critical 
question, given the ramifications for strong and weak judicial review. However, the 
likelihood of “interventionist review” of this wide-ranging institutional package on the 
part of the Court remains far from certain. Rather, the Court may be unwilling to say 
that the Emperor has no clothes.  
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